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The ability of the Department of Defense to execute 
its mission is directly dependent on the capability to 
produce and maintain weapon systems.  Rapid advances in 
technology have been instrumental to the development of 
highly efficient and capable systems.  However, they have 
also increased the rate at which electronic part 
manufacturers change product lines resulting in the 
Department of Defense’s increasing dependence on obsolete 
electronic components.  The objective of this thesis is to 
provide a viable tool for managers to eliminate, mitigate, 
and proactively manage the growing obsolescence problem.  
The thesis will define obsolescence, provide a 
comprehensive discussion of ongoing obsolescence 
initiatives, and provide a systematic approach to manage 
microelectronic obsolescence.  The thesis will also explore 
and provide recommendations to address the increasingly 
common scenario where an ongoing weapon system production 
program receives little or no notification of a part going 
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I.  INTRODUCTION  
A.   STUDY FOCUS 
The Department of Defense (DOD) has a mission greatly 
dependent on the weapon systems under its control.  These 
systems have historically taken years to develop and 
produce and remain in service typically for decades.  The 
industrial base during this extended period evolves to 
embrace new technologies.  However, a technological 
revolution has caused the rate of evolution to increase 
substantially.  The result is that DOD finds it 
increasingly difficult and, in some cases, impossible to 
obtain parts necessary to produce and maintain weapon 
systems. 
B.   OBJECTIVE 
The objective of this research is to characterize the 
growing problem of microelectronic obsolescence and develop 
a systematic approach that weapon system managers can use 
to manage or mitigate the problem.  The study concentrates 
on situations in which the manufacturer provides limited or 
no notification that it will cease production of an 
electronic component used to produce the weapon system.  
The thesis makes recommendations that program offices could 
implement before a manufacturer notifies them of their 
intent to discontinue or change product lines.  
Implementation of these recommendations would provide an 
institutionalized proactive management system instead of 
the traditional reactive obsolescence management, greatly 
reducing the probability of unexpected manufacturer 
notification.  This approach, including the steps to 
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identify the problem early, should also result in an 
overall decrease in the impacts currently experienced by 
DOD programs. 
The thesis also considers the current procurement 
climate as it relates to obsolescence.  It will 
specifically focus on the regulations that preclude 
procurement of parts needed to ensure uninterrupted end-
item production. 
The thesis is organized as follows:  Chapter 2 
provides a comprehensive understanding of the problem; 
Chapter 3 presents the data from relevant sources; and 
Chapter 4 provides an analysis of the data followed by 
Chapter 5 that provides conclusions and recommendations. 
C.   RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The primary question this thesis will address is:  
What actions should be taken to allow successful management 
of microelectronic obsolescence?  Additional questions 
include: 
1.  What problems result from microelectronic 
obsolescence? 
2.  What should be changed in the acquisition process 
to support microelectronic obsolescence management? 
3.  What steps can a program office implement to 
manage microelectronic obsolescence? 
4.  What can new programs do to minimize the impact of 
microelectronic obsolescence? 
5.  What commercial tools are available to manage 
microelectronic obsolescence? 
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6.  What resources are available with the U.S. 
Government to address microelectronic obsolescence?  
D.   METHODOLOGY 
Industry has and continues, at an increasing rate, to 
progress technologically.  This progression, along with the 
extended length of time DOD historically needs to develop 
and retain fielded systems, results in DOD’s growing 
inability to obtain needed but discontinued microelectronic 
parts.  This study concentrates on addressing program 
managers’ problems with discontinued parts.  Data derived 
to support this thesis were obtained from interviews with 
DOD and industry representatives including representatives 
from Rochester, Landsdale, Diminishing Manufacturing 
Sources (DMS) teaming group, and the Defense 
Microelectronics Activity (DMEA).  Legal personnel working 
in the DOD also provided information.  Information also was 
obtained from numerous written sources including; journals, 
DOD personnel, DOD sponsored websites, and DOD pamphlets.  
The reader is assumed to have a strong background in 
Government procurement procedures and regulations. 
E.   SCOPE AND STUDY LIMITATIONS 
The study will focus only on the current problems DOD 
managers are experiencing due to microelectronic 
obsolescence.  Conclusions and recommendations support only 
DOD managers and their industry counterparts.  This thesis 
will only address the current procurement rules impeding 
program managers.  It will address the situation when 
redesign is required to eliminate an obsolete component and 
the redesign effort spans two or more years.  The study 
will include a review of some but not all of the tools 
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currently available to aid in the management of 
obsolescence and include a discussion of some of the 
obsolescence resources available within DOD. 
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II.  BACKGROUND  
A.   INTRODUCTION 
Program managers are facing a growing problem: 
microelectronic obsolescence.  The problem is not new.  
Managers have been responsible for resolving this problem 
for decades.  However, the magnitude of the problem 
continues to increase. 
Historically, obsolescence has occurred after 
completion of or well into the production phase of the 
program.  Unfortunately, however, obsolescence is becoming 
prevalent during system development and the initial stages 
of production.  [Ref. 1: p. 2]  Irrespective of the program 
phase, the underlying problem remains the same.  
This chapter provides a discussion of the underlying 
reasons for obsolescence and its impact on the DOD. 
B.   PROGRAM LIFE CYCLES 
Historically, systems have progressed through numerous 
development stages including engineering and manufacturing 
development followed by production and, ultimately, 
sustainment.  The formal guidance outlining the steps for 
weapon system development has changed, but the underlying 
intent has not.  The overall objective of the development 
phase was to test, mature, and verify a producible design 
before proceeding into production.  Design during this 
effort typically considered using products that were 
readily available from the commercial market.  The design 
process included specific steps to evaluate parts in order 
to help ensure that suppliers would continue manufacturing 
5 
parts needed to support the program.  Commercial electronic 
products historically had life cycles of approximately ten 
years.  [Ref. 2: p.18] 
The life cycle, from a weapon system designer’s 
perspective, began with the initial availability of the 
part to the point at which the industrial base no longer 
supported it.  The part was considered obsolete when the 
original manufacturer or after-market source, no longer 
would supply it.  However, technological changes are 
accelerating and substantially compressing the life cycle 
of commercial microelectronic parts.  DOD’s system life 
cycle, unfortunately, far exceeds that of the typical 
commercial product.  Figure 1 depicts this life cycle 
mismatch. 
              Product Life Cycles 
Figure 1.   Product Life Cycles.  From Ref 3: p. 35 
The difference between the commercial and military 
product life cycles, as depicted in Figure 1, although not 
definitive, illustrates the magnitude of the problem.  
Although the problem is currently not insurmountable, one 
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needs to consider that the two lifecycles appear to be 
growing further apart, thus exacerbating the current 
problem [Ref. 4: p. 74] 
C.   DOD INITIATIVES 
DOD has taken steps to minimize the mismatch between 
commercial and military product life cycles.  These steps 
include greater emphasis on utilizing Commercial Off the 
Shelf (COTS) hardware, reliance on performance-based 
procurements, designs using open architectures, parts 
standardization and the initiation of numerous pilot 
programs.  (Ref. 5: p. 1]  These positive steps, though, 
have not eliminated the problem.  DOD will need to 
implement additional changes to further address the issue. 
1.  Transistors 
One way to gain a better appreciation for the life 
cycle of a part is to look at it from an historical 
perspective.  Consider, for example, the basic transistor, 
an electronic component conceived in 1948.  [Ref. 6:p. 82]  
The initial part, though not highly efficient by current 
standards, changed the direction of technology and 
industry.  Systems were no longer designed using vacuum 
tubes, but were produced as solid-state devices using 
transistors. 
Since introduction of the transistor, industry has 
increasingly relied on this technology and has continued to 
refine the manufacturing methods to reduce its size and 
capability.  The transistor, initially the size of a human 
fingertip, was, by the mid-1960s, capable of being produced 
the size of a grain of salt.  Currently, chipmakers are 
capable of incorporating approximately seven million 
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transistors within less space than the original unit 
occupied.  [Ref. 7: p. 72] 
There is growing concern that the manufacturer’s 
ability to further reduce the size of transistors may be 
reaching its technological limits.  Although technology may 
be limited by current manufacturing techniques, one can be 
confident that, sometime in the near future, the problem 
will be resolved or overcome by some new method or 
technology.  This new method may be a refinement of the 
current process or may shift to another technology such as 
microscopic mechanical devices. [Ref. 8: p. 46] 
2.  Microprocessors 
Transistors serve as the basic building block of the 
modern microprocessor.  These devices are becoming 
indispensable in the design of most modern commercial and 
military products.  Microprocessors, as shown in Figure 2, 
which have incorporated additional capacity at an 
exponential rate, illustrate the rapid advancement of 
technology. 









              Transistor Densities 
Figure 2.   Transistor Densities.  From Ref 7: p. 71 
Microprocessors have changed significantly since the 
early 1970s, and their use both in weapon systems and in 
commercial products has increased substantially.  The rate 
of evolution or growth of microprocessors follows Moore’s 
Law.  Gordon Moore, a co-founder of Intel, predicted that 
the number of transistors on a microchip would double 
approximately every year-and-a-half.  This prediction, 
which has shown itself to be fundamentally sound, has been 
deemed Moore’s Law.  [Ref. 9: p. 32] 
Due to the microprocessor’s ever-growing capability, 
planes, missile systems, and even cars now use multiple 
microprocessors per end-item to provide greater control, 
efficiency, and value to the product.  This dependency on 
the microprocessor, and on rapidly changing capabilities 
and technologies in general, is the basis for the current 
dilemma DOD faces. 
D.   DOD AND THE COMMERCIAL MARKET 
DOD’s dependency on the commercial market is being 
driven not only by the need for greater capabilities, but 
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also by DOD’s decreasing market share.  Figure 3 depicts 
the shrinking share of the integrated circuit market that 
DOD represents. 
                   DOD’s Market Share 
 
Figure 3.   DOD’s Market Share.  From Ref 10:p. 18 
DOD’s share of the integrated circuit market decreased 
from sixteen percent in 1975 to one percent in 1995 and, 
currently, is less than one percent [Ref. 9: p. 369].  Due 
to the current economy, the limited DOD budget, and the 
increasing complexity and cost of weapon systems, there is 
reason to assume that this trend will continue.  Figure 4 
further illustrates the historically diminishing and 
insignificant percentage DOD represents and the 
distribution of semiconductor usage by market. 
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Figure 4.   Total Worldwide Semiconductor Usage Market.  From 
Ref 11: p. 80 
At the heart of DOD’s obsolescence problem are market 
globalization, the substantially larger commercial market, 
the corresponding potential for profits, and the rapid 
change in technology that mirrors Moore’s Law.  The DOD may 
need several thousand parts per year across all production 
and support programs.  However, DOD, with its relatively 
small or insignificant overall parts requirement, has to 
compete with the telecommunication market, the computer 
market, and other commodity markets that annually require 
millions of parts representing quantities that are orders 
of magnitude more than required to support US weapon 
systems.  DOD’s diminishing parts requirements correlate to 
the historically diminishing DOD market share.  [Ref. 4: p. 
74] 
Since the DOD reflects a negligible and shrinking 
percentage of the potential overall production 
requirements, manufacturers necessarily concentrate on the 
commercial sector to provide the required return on their 
substantial investment.  Commercial manufacturers, in many 
cases, no longer even consider military requirements, which 
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means that the DOD has a negligible influence on 
manufacturers to continue production of small quantities of 
obsolete or specialized products.  Since the commercial 
sector controls the market, the DOD has few options and 
must take steps to assimilate the current market conditions 
into its long-term planning. 
Additionally, since numerous companies have chosen to 
concentrate solely on the commercial sector to avoid the 
cumbersome Government bureaucracy and maximize profits, one 
can assume that this trend most likely continue.  
Consequently, one can conclude that this will ultimately 
result in a very small number of suppliers dedicated solely 
or primarily to military requirements.  Unfortunately, 
small specialty markets generally correspond to higher 
costs, which are in direct opposition to DOD’s goal, need, 
and initiative to develop and produce systems with less 
investment and lower unit production costs. 
One other point to consider is commercial investment.  
Generally, manufacturers of electronic microcircuits are 
forced to invest substantial effort and capital to obtain 
the tools and facilities necessary to produce 
microelectronic products.  Intel, for example, recently 
invested approximately $1.3 B in a new production facility.  
[Ref. 7: p. 61] 
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Industry will continue to invest and develop ways to 
produce and reduce costs in order to retain or gain market 
share and the corresponding profits.  They will continue to 
obtain cost reductions by investing in research to find new 
or better ways to perform current activities or to come up 
with newer technologies.  Although research continues with 
no guarantees that it will provide a return on the 
investment, one can be sure that industrial advancements 
will be made resulting in changes to the product 
configuration.  Assuming that technology continues to 
advance, two questions remain: How fast will this occur?  
How can DOD gain the greatest benefit from it? 
E.   GOVERNMENT INITIATIVES 
In 1999, the Apache helicopter received Congressional 
approval of funds specifically earmarked to address 
processor obsolescence.  [Ref. 4: p. 78]  The F-22 annually 
spends millions to address obsolescence and major DOD 
contractors are becoming less willing to enter into 
contracts that do not include language protecting them from 
the potential impacts of obsolescence.  [Ref. 1: p. 5]  One 
way DOD is trying to capitalize on ever-changing market 
technologies is by increasing the use of COTS hardware.  
This philosophy was initiated by Secretary William Perry, 
who issued a directive reversing the previous reliance on 
military specifications to favor commercial standards.  
[Ref. 12]  The philosophical intent was to follow the 
commercial market and capitalize on growing commercial 
capabilities to enhance the military. 
The Government also has established the Diminishing 
Manufacturing Source (DMS) steering group to address the 
situation.  Therefore, the growing obsolescence problem has 
not gone unnoticed and will need to receive additional 
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III.  DATA 
A.   INTRODUCTION 
Is obsolescence a significant problem?  The DOD, as 
previously discussed, no longer controls or even has much 
influence on the microelectronics market since it reflects 
less than one percent of the overall market share.  This 
negligible demand, coupled with the substantial and 
increasing weapon system life cycle, has resulted in DOD 
weapon system managers finding more and more of their 
microelectronic parts to be increasingly difficult to find.  
Additionally, DOD’s mission has become more difficult to 
due to the increased pace at which technology has been 
changing and the corresponding rapid turnover of 
microelectronic parts.  The increasing life cycle 
difference, along with the small portion of the 
microelectronic market DOD commands, leads to the 
conclusion that microelectronic part obsolescence is here 
to stay and will grow unless there are some changes. 
How big is the obsolescence problem for DOD?  There is 
no definitive answer since each service and weapon system 
represents various levels and types of technologies in 
addition to each program independently managing problems 
associated with their system.   
This chapter provides data on microelectronic market 
trends, DOD obsolescence initiatives, and DOD procurement 
and funding requirements.  This information coupled with 
DOD specific examples of obsolescence impacts will 
demonstrate and provide insight into the breadth of the 
problem.  This information will subsequently be used to 
15 
establish guidelines that weapon system managers can use to 
better manage their programs. 
B.   PROCUREMENT POLICY 
The DOD has strict guidelines for procurement, which 
are delineated in the Federal Acquisition Regulations and 
supporting documentation.  The basic philosophy of these 
regulations is to ensure that the end product or services 
are obtained in a fair and equitable manner.  They also are 
in place to help ensure that funds are used specifically 
for the intended purpose.  In addition to these 
regulations, the DOD developed a substantial and 
comprehensive list of military specifications that were 
used extensively in procurements to help ensure delivery of 
a robust and supportable system. 
However, these guidelines and specifications were used 
during the period when DOD was at the forefront of 
technology, was steering the focus and development of 
technology and commanded a substantial portion of the 
electronics market.  This situation has reversed itself 
however, and the commercial sector now controls and steers 
the development and focus of technology as shown in Figure 
4. 
The DOD has taken steps to enhance its capabilities by 
capitalizing on the technological progress of the market.  
At the same time, the DOD has instituted acquisition-
streamlining initiatives in an attempt to reduce overall 
development, operation, and support costs.  This focus on 
streamlining the procurement process began when Secretary 
William Perry, in 1994, issued a letter reversing the use 
of military specifications to favor commercial standards.  
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This, along with the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act, 
has been the catalyst for ongoing acquisition reform.  The 
spirit of this reform is to provide the commercial market 
greater license to use its inherent ingenuity, agility, and 
technical knowledge without hindrance from unnecessary 
Government constraints, resulting in higher quality, more 
capability, and lower DOD total life cycle costs. 
1.  Procurement Laws 
a.  DOD 5002 
 Although there have been many changes to the 
procurement process, the procurement system still contains 
rigid and stringent requirements.  One applicable 
requirement is DOD 5002-R, which states that, for ACAT 1D 
programs, 
. . . long lead-time material or effort may be 
procured with advance procurement funds, but only 
in sufficient quantity to support the next fiscal 
year quantity end-item. 
 
b.  Statute 31 USC 1502(a) 
Another applicable law is Statute 31 USC 1502 
(a), which states:  
The balance of an appropriation or fund limited 
for obligation to a definite period is available 
only for payment of expenses properly incurred 
during the period of availability or to complete 
contracts properly made within that period of 
availability and obligated consistent with 
section 1501 of this title.  However, the 
appropriation is not available for expenditure 
for a period beyond what was authorized by law. 
c.  Statute 31 USC 1341(a) 
This law states: 
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 (a) (1) An officer or employee of the 
United States Government or of the District of 
Columbia government may not . . . (b) involve 
either government in a contract or obligation for 
the payment of money before and appropriation is 
made unless authorized by law . . . . 
These laws, along with others, were enacted to 
ensure that funds were used as designated by Congress.  
They specifically state that funds cannot be used to 
support requirements beyond the immediate contract, helping 
to ensure and preclude misappropriation of funds. 
2.  Obsolescence Management Impediments 
The spirit of the law is clear and, historically, has 
been very successful.  However, these laws are becoming a 
serious impediment to weapon system managers.  The problem 
stems from the inability of program managers to buy a 
sufficient quantity of parts going out of production to 
support the ongoing and near term production program. 
The following example will illustrate the problem.  
Assume that a manufacturer of an electronic component plans 
to discontinue production of a microprocessor used to 
manufacture a military aircraft.  Assume, also, that the 
Government has been made aware of the manufacturers' intent 
and has determined two technically viable solutions to the 
problem. 
One potential solution would be to procure a limited 
quantity of microprocessors.  The limited procurement would 
allow production to continue while the obsolete 
microprocessor was being designed out of the system.  
Typical redesign takes two or more years.  However, the 
existing laws explicitly preclude the use funds to support 
out-year procurements.  The program office, therefore, 
would have only one legal option, which would result in 
unavoidable and potentially very expensive program impact. 
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One might argue that the program office could have 
obtained authorization for advanced procurement funds to 
cover this situation.  However, the advanced procurement 
funding would authorize procurement of parts to cover only 
one additional year beyond the immediate contract 
requirements.  In many instances, this would not prevent a 
negative impact on the program since the necessary redesign 
would not be completed until well after the existing parts 
obtained with the advanced procurement funds had run out. 
There would be another difficulty with using advanced 
procurement funds to resolve the problem.  Advanced 
procurement typically requires a detailed description of 
the parts to be procured and is programmed well in advance 
of the requirement.  Unfortunately, manufacturers usually 
do not provide much, if any, advanced notice of their 
intent to change product lines.  Even when they provide 
notification, the information is provided only shortly 
before the change occurs.  Using advanced procurement 
funds, though possible, would be an unlikely long-term 
solution since the overall budgeting cycle would be to slow 
to provide a viable option. 
The other potential solution, assuming that issues of 
legality could be overcome, would be to execute a life-of-
type buy.  The intent with this option would be to procure 
all the parts necessary to support the remainder of the 
program.  This includes the remaining requirements to 
support end-item production, new spares production, repair 
of spares and, potentially, foreign military sales. 
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However, there are problems with this option.  The 
first problem would be to accurately project the number of 
parts needed to support production.  Major production 
programs are required to develop long-term projections in 
order to support the planning and budgeting cycle.  These 
plans include the projected end item quantities by fiscal 
year.  However, these long-term projections routinely 
change for a variety of reasons to include shifts in DOD 
priority and sales to foreign countries.  Irrespective, 
these program changes make it nearly impossible to make 
accurate predictions. 
Additionally, it would be very difficult to accurately 
project the number of parts needed to support new spares 
production.  The difficulty arises directly from the 
potential variability of the major items.  This variability 
coupled with the uncertainty associated with additional 
potential sales to foreign nations, results in the 
certainty that any projections would, potentially, be 
grossly inaccurate.  There remains one other consideration: 
obsolescence. 
Assuming it was possible to accurately predict the 
quantity of parts required for the remainder of the 
program, there would remain the possibility that some other 
part used on the same assembly would become obsolete.  
However, obsolescence of another part on the same assembly 
would negate the benefits obtained from the life-of-type 
procurement.  Unfortunately, the likelihood of other parts 
becoming obsolete is high due to the increasing rate that 
technology is advancing. 
C.   COMMERCIAL OFF THE SHELF (COTS) HARDWARE 
Acquisition streamlining includes increased reliance 
on COTS products.  The intent is to use the available and 
emerging commercial technologies, thereby reducing or 
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eliminating DOD’s need for expensive research and 
development.  It should also help to provide soldiers with 
newer capabilities faster. 
The philosophy has merits and may help to reduce the 
impact from obsolescence, but it is currently not the 
complete solution.  One difficulty associated with COTS 
would be finding a product with the necessary functions 
that would not require substantial modifications or 
testing.  The more daunting issue would be to find 
commercial products designed to withstand military 
environments. 
The following example readily illustrates the point.  
One can currently obtain, for a reasonable price from 
various commercial vendors, a high quality computer with a 
high-speed microprocessor and numerous other features.  The 
computer would provide the soldier the required 
functionality.  However, this product was not designed to 
operate in freezing temperatures or in humid or wet 
environments, or to function after being dropped or 
transported over rough terrain.  Use of this product in 
such a demanding environments would quickly eliminate any 
utility and negate all perceived savings and benefits. 
Another concern with COTS is the product life cycle.  
Due to the increased rate of technological progress, the 
commercial sector assumes that product lives are generally 
limited to several years.  They design products assuming 
that they will be replaced in the near future, while the 
military supports end-items for decades as indicated in 
Figure 5.  [Ref. 13: p. A33-3] 
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                     DOD System Life 
Figure 5.     DOD System Life.  From Ref 14: p. I-2 
Another point to consider is that commercial products, 
even if they remain available for an extended period, 
evolve.  There is no assurance that a product the DOD 
obtains one year will be available or identical to the item 
procured the next.  Changes to the product may provide 
additional utility, but they may also cause problems if the 
product were integrated into a more complex system.  
Problems can arise from slight timing changes that make it 
impossible for microprocessors to synchronize or interface 
changes that result in system degradation or failure.  The 
bottom line is that the DOD does not necessarily have 
insight into or control over the product configuration. 
The lack of insight into product configuration could 
be partially resolved if the interfaces were stable to 
include all relevant technical parameters.  However, even 
if the interfaces were stable, the program would still have 
to plan and budget for replacement of the COTs product in 
the near future since support of the legacy versions most 
likely would be unavailable or become overly expensive.  
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The overall result would be a continuous, incremental 
replacement of COTS hardware within the system.  This would 
necessitate ongoing engineering type analysis to determine 
and verify system compatibility, including changes to other 
parts of the system to ensure successful integration. 
1.  Logistical Implications of COTS 
The use of COTS hardware also affect the DOD Logistics 
system.  Currently, item managers typically procure parts 
based on national stock numbers.  The parts associated with 
these numbers generally have technical data packages that 
provide the necessary information for vendors to produce 
the item.  Configuration control of COTS hardware, however, 
typically remains under the vendor’s control.  As indicated 
previously, the COTS hardware, by definition, primarily 
supports the commercial market and usually evolves through 
periodic, pre-planned improvements.  The manufacturer may 
take into consideration the desire for the new item to 
remain compatible with previously built hardware.  However, 
the manufacturer, in most cases, would necessarily place 
substantially more weight on the needs of the commercial 
market rather than on those of the military. 
The overall responsibility of item managers has 
therefore increased.  They are now responsible for ensuring 
that an increasing number of commercial items work within 
the constraints of the overall weapon system.  They may be 
able to accomplish this by working with the vendor who may 
provide the applicable technical information to support 
this.  However, even if the vendor is cooperative, there 
remains the possibility that the delivered item would not 
function within the system. 
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Integration problems can occur if some or any of the 
critical parts were changed.  The newer parts may have 
specifications identical to those of the replaced parts.  
However, there may be slight changes in the rise time or in 
the frequency response resulting in total or partial 
functional degradation.  This loss of functionality may not 
be immediately obvious, but may manifest itself in periodic 
and apparent random failures.  One could argue that this 
scenario is not new or isolated to COTs hardware.  However, 
one could not argue that the magnitude of the problem has 
substantially increased since there is less insight and 
control of the configuration baseline.  The increased use 
of COTS and the corresponding increased rate of 
technological change exacerbate this problem. 
In addition to the reduced insight, vendors are 
becoming more specialized.  This specialization has 
resulted in vendors and system integrators procuring more 
black boxes and integrating them into their end-products.  
Due to the increased specialization and focus on cost 
reduction, vendors are continuously integrating new parts 
into end- items.  As a result, it is becoming increasingly 
likely that the item delivered to the Government will not 
be identical to what was procured before.   
The only way to ensure that the procured item works 
would be to test it.  The item manager would, thus, be 
responsible for performing a series of tests prior to 
accepting the hardware.  The additional verification is 




D.   CORPORATE SUPPORT 
Although the Government may be unable to support 
future contracts by incrementally procuring parts that are 
being discontinued, it is possible that the system 
integrator could take the initiative to procure parts to 
protect the ongoing production program.  However, recent 
direction from DOD specifically states that the Government 
should not encourage contractors to supplement DOD 
appropriations by bearing a portion of defense contract 
costs.  [Ref. 15: p. 1]   
This language refers specifically to research and 
development activities, but the underlying intention is 
applicable to production type programs as well. 
This direction is not the only impediment to 
contractor investment.  The DOD operates under constantly 
changing conditions.  These changes affect priorities and, 
necessarily, program funding, which may increase or 
decrease substantially, making it nearly impossible to make 
accurate projections and, therefore develop long-term 
plans.  This inability, coupled with the likelihood that 
the program may change, serves as a disincentive for the 
contractor to invest corporate funds to protect the 
program.  Even if the contractor took the initiative to 
protect the program, the Government could not guarantee 
reimbursement.  Although the part could possibly be used in 






E.   MARKET CONDITIONS 
The DOD budget, though substantial, represents a small 











Figure 6.     DOD’s Slice of the Dollar.  From Ref 16 
The commercial market, on the other hand, has 
experienced significant growth during the last decade.  
Growth has been driven by technology that has increased the 
ease and ability to communicate resulting in a global 
market economy.  [Ref. 17: p. 9]  This global economy has 
lowered competitors’ entry costs and barriers, leading to a 
substantial increase in competition.  This increase has 
provided the consumer with lower prices and greater 
choices.  In this global, market-driven economy, DOD 
represents a small percentage of the overall commerce. 
F.   MICROELECTRONIC SUPPLIERS 
Several representatives from industry were contacted 
to offer their perspective regarding obsolescence.  There 
was general agreement that obsolescence has challenged and 
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will continue to challenge the DOD.  This was also 
confirmed at a recent Defense Manufacturing Conference 
where several speakers noted that obsolescence was becoming 
a systemic problem [Ref. 18].  The speakers specifically 
noted that the Airforces’ F-22 program, the Navys’ DDX 
development program, and the Missile Defense Agencies’ 
programs were all necessarily focusing more on 
obsolescence. 
The information provided confirmed that DOD represents 
only a very small portion of the semiconductor market and 
controlled less than one-half of one percent of the world 
market for the year 2000.  It also confirmed the large and 
growing divergence between the life cycle of commercial 
semiconductors and the life cycle of military systems.  
Consequently, it was estimated that the percentage of 
obsolete parts in fielded military products was currently 
in the range of twelve percent, with after-market sources 
currently able to support approximately thirty-five percent 
of these obsolete parts.  [Ref. 19] 
The interviewees also indicated that sixty-five 
percent of the parts used in some fielded military systems 
were obsolete.  Some suggested using part emulation to 
partially overcome this problem.  After-market sources were 
taking action to develop teaming agreements with the 
original equipment manufacturers.  The intent of these 
agreements were to help ensure that the technical data, 
tooling, and dies needed to produce the electronic parts 
were not destroyed at the end of the program but 
transferred to the after-market source. 
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The design of future semiconductors also was projected 
to increase the level of obsolescence.  The majority of 
semiconductor devices currently used within DOD hardware 
require five-volt power sources.  However, the current 
trend in industry is toward more efficient devices that 
consume less power.  Semiconductors previously designed to 
operate on the standard five volts are now designed to 
operate on a 3.3V power source, with plans to convert to 
devices requiring 1V or less.  It was projected that 
industry would support the 5V devices for approximately 
another decade.  However, newer devices were anticipated to 
have a markedly shorter product life.  There also was 
concern regarding the environments in which commercial 
microchips were designed to operate.  Commercial devices 
are designed to operate from zero to seventy degrees, 
Celsius, while the military typically requires a 
substantially greater range. 
One other area of concern for DOD was the number of 
vendors supplying military-grade parts.  The current trend 
is for companies to focus on the commercial market.  
Numerous companies, including Intel, Motorola, and 
Phillips, have stopped supplying military parts.  The 
projections were that, unless the need for military 
products substantially increased, the number of vendors 
that supply military grade parts would continue to 
diminish. 
1.  Impact to Fielded Systems  
The PATRIOT missile system is a fairly large and 
complex weapon that has been in the field for decades.  It 
represents a typical fielded weapon system that consists of 
numerous major end items containing thousands of electronic 
parts covering a broad spectrum of technologies.  
Unfortunately, obsolescence has and will continue to 
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adversely affect this system.  A recent study showed that 
approximately 10 percent of the overall system contained 
parts that are or are projected to be impacted by 
obsolescence [Ref. 20]. 
An example, that illustrates the impact obsolescence 
can and did have on the PATRIOT system, is the missile 
Fuze.  This complex component was an integral part of the 
missile and relied on the availability of a variety of 
microelectronic parts to include hybrid microcircuits.  
These hybrids were custom parts used specifically for one 
purpose and were, therefore, available from only one 
qualified source.  Toward the end of the missile production 
program, the hybrid manufacturer notified the program 
office of their intent to cease hybrid production. 
Since PATRIOT was an international program, action was 
taken to notify all countries of the company’s intent to 
quit producing hybrids.  In this case, the foreign partners 
as well as the US Government were provided the luxury of 
being provided notification from the manufacturer before 
the hybrid production line had been dismantled.  This early 
notification provided the time needed for each country to 
determine what steps they should be take to protect their 
individual programs.  
Unfortunately, after the company dismantled the hybrid 
production line, the requirement for additional fuzes 
arose.  The program office had two choices.  They could 
either qualify another source to manufacture the custom 
hybrids or initiate a redesign. 
Before any decision or action was taken, the program 
office performed a study to characterize the risks 
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associated with both approaches [Ref. 21].  The study 
determined that, since the fuze had been developed numerous 
years ago, it contained numerous other parts that were or 
were on the verge of becoming obsolete.  This risk 
associated with the other obsolete parts, coupled with the 
cost and difficulty associated with developing another 
qualified hybrid microcircuit source, led the program 
office to initiate a re-design of the applicable portions 
of the fuze.  Due to the complexity and sensitivity of the 
fuze along with the magnitude of the re-design, the overall 
design and qualification effort took approximately three 
years at a substantial cost.  [Ref. 22]  Although this 
example may not represent the typical or average 
obsolescence scenario, it does clearly demonstrate that 
obsolescence can and does have a significant impact on 
hardware. 
The PATRIOT program office, in an attempt to 
proactively manage the growing obsolescence problem, 
initiated a dedicated Integrated Product Team.  The mission 
of this IPT was to develop and implement a process that 
continuously and systematically addressed obsolescence.  
Due to the sensitivity and importance of this problem, the 
international PATRIOT community agreed to permanently 
support and fund this effort.  This cooperative effort 
resulted in the establishment of defined roles for the 
Government and the system integrator to jointly identify 
and address the problems resulting from obsolescence. 
Over time, the objective of the IPT has not changed.  
However, its scope has expanded to include teaming with the 
logistics as well as the Aviation and Missile Command 
community with the intent to protect ongoing major end item 
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production along with current and, more importantly, 
projected spares procurements.  This effort has identified 
numerous problems providing, the program office along with 
the logistics and international community, the necessary 
information and, in some cases, the necessary time to act 
individually or jointly to protect ongoing and projected 
efforts. 
In addition to the efforts taken by the program 
office, the PATRIOT system integrator has recognized 
obsolescence as a chronic problem and has taken an 
additional step to combat it.  The objective of this step 
was to develop a more efficient way to consistently address 
microelectronic obsolescence [Ref. 20].  This need resulted 
in the formation of a team that studied the overall problem 
from a system perspective. 
This team subsequently developed a software tool that 
linked the systems’ overall parts list to an in-house tool 
that identified and projected obsolescence.  This new tool 
provided an automated method to efficiently analyze the 
entire weapon system from an obsolescence perspective.  
Exercise of this tool was envisioned to occur each time the 
system integrator responded to a request for proposal and 
should significantly reduce obsolescence-related problems 
before and after contract award. 
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Discussions have indicated that steps may be taken to 
enhance this tool by linking it to additional databases and 
predictors to provide more information that would expand 
and greatly improve the ability to project, identify, and 
proactively manage the problem.  This insight should 
greatly enhance the capability to identify, project, and 
manage obsolescence. 
The problem of obsolescence is unfortunately not 
isolated to PATRIOT.  Numerous other systems, representing 
all of the military services, have experienced this 
problem.  These systems include the Apache and Kiowa 
helicopters, the QAS-20X Anti-mine counter measure system, 
the F-15, and the TRIDENT weapon system [Ref. 23].  The 
potential cost associated with the impacts has been 













Figure 7.   F-15 Cost Avoidance.  From Ref 23 
Another good example of the impact due to obsolescence 
is the radar system on the F-15.  Obsolescence impacted the 
radar system resulting in the need for a redesign saving 
approximately 500M.  [Ref. 24] 
2.  Impact to Developmental Systems  
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Obsolescence is, unfortunately, not isolated to mature 
systems.  Programs that are in development or in the early 
stages of production are also being impacted.  One such 
program is the F-22 where action was taken to reprogram 
approximately 81M to address obsolescence.  [Ref. 25}  
Another example is the PAC-3 missile that has recently 
completed development.  This program, though in the very 
early stages of production, was allocated approximately 15M 
to address obsolescence and help ensure uninterrupted 
production.  [Ref. 26]  Development programs such as the 
Theater High Altitude Air Defense system and the Medium 
Extended Air Defense System have included or are working to 
incorporate specific language in the development contracts 
to address and mitigate the impact of obsolescence. 
These examples demonstrate that obsolescence 
represents a problem for the Army, Navy, and Airforce in 
both fielded and developmental systems. 
Another way to gain an appreciation for the size of 
the obsolescence problems is to consider the number of 
parts submitted to the Government Industry Data Exchange 
Program for resolution.  The following graph shows the number 



















Figure 8.   Total DMSMS Parts Submittal.  From Ref 27 
The following figure depicts the quantity of parts 
that obsolescence has impacted for three specific systems 
further supporting the premise that diminishing sources may 
affect approximately 5-10 percent of the parts within 











Figure 9.   GIDEP Data.  From Ref 28 
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It is to be noted that the average cost to redesign a 
board is $250,000.  [Ref.25] Although no data was found to 
estimate the number of these parts that require redesign, 
one can safely assume that, as systems become older, the 
number of required redesigns increase along with the 
associated design costs.  Additionally, even if redesigns 
were not required, there were costs associated with 
finding, developing and implementing solutions. 
The previous information further demonstrates that 
microelectronic obsolescence has adversely affected weapon 
systems in every phase of their life cycle representing 
every military service.  It also has shown that the impacts 
are costly and therefore require intense management.  
G.   GOVERNMENT RESOURCES 
1.  Diminishing Manufacturing Sources  (DMS) 
The DOD and NATO recognized that changing technology 
would impact the ability of the services to produce and 
sustain systems.  [Ref. 16: p. iii]  This recognition led 
to the establishment of a formal organization to address 
obsolescence was a positive first step toward obtaining 
insight into and control over the problem.  DOD 4140.1-R 
established the DMS steering group.  The overall objective 
of DMS, as stated in AMC-P 5-23, is to  
support readiness by minimizing 
obsolescence/nonavailability problems in Army 
system/equipment. 
The charter of DMS is very broad and encompasses 
weapon systems in all phases of the life cycle. 
The DMS organization is led by the Air Force, with the 
Deputy Chief of Staff for Research, Development and 
Acquisition having the overall management responsibility 
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for this action within the Army.  All services are 
encouraged to participate in this organization, and the DMS 
organization serves as the framework for the services to 
interact.  More importantly, it provides a formal 
organization on which program offices can rely on for 
experienced support. 
An important benefit of having a formal organization 
is the increased ability to obtain and consolidate 
information.  This ability allows the working group to 
track trends and support a lesson-learned database from 
which other programs can benefit.  The DMS serves as the 
formal mechanism for consolidating the services’ problems 
and supports open discussions to foster common and 
efficient solutions. 
Participants in the DMS initiative are not only 
Government organizations.  Some are from microelectronic 
producers and major weapon systems integrators.  Current 
industry participants include Raytheon, Boeing, Rochester, 
and Lansdale.  The DMS serves as the forum for managers, 
producers, integrators, and suppliers to effectively and 
systematically exchange information and ideas. 
The DMS group is only partially funded by DOD, but 
provides a viable forum for other Government organizations 
to interface and work with industry or program offices.  
One such organization is the Defense Micro-Electronics 
Activity. 
2.  Defense Micro-Electronics Activity (DMEA) 
The DMEA is a Government sponsored organization with a 
far-reaching mission.  Its efforts are concentrated 
specifically on microelectronics technology including 
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obsolescence, technology insertion, reverse engineering, 
and in-house microelectronic manufacturing capability.  The 
DMEA also works to form partnerships with industry in an 
attempt to impede the spread and minimize the impact of 
obsolescence. 
The DMEA has had experience in developing custom 
programmable solutions to resolve obsolescence.  It also 
has developed working relationships with the Defense 
Logistics Agency (DLA), Boeing, General Dynamics, Lockheed-
Martin, Raytheon, and TRW.  These working relationships 
were developed so that all participants could remain 
abreast of technical trends and problems.  They also 
provide the opportunity for participants to learn about and 
potentially capitalize on favorable solutions implemented 
by others.  These alliances also allow companies, all 
facing similar problems, to consult with one another and 
find solutions more efficiently. 
The DMEA recognizes that rapid changes in technology 
can impact fielded programs.  One way DMEA has found to 
provide DOD some flexibility is its flexible foundry.  This 
capability allows DMEA, assuming it has the appropriate 
dies and documentation, to produce quantities of 
microelectronic devices such as amplifiers, mixed signal 
application specific integrated circuits, and gate arrays.  
Although this capability may not be the ultimate solution 
for a program impacted by obsolescence, it could provide a 
limited number of parts to support the field or production 
line.  These parts would provide the bridge to get over the 
immediate problem, allowing the program office additional 
time to develop and implement a long-term solution. 
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The DMEA also has experience in technology insertion 
and engineering analysis, capabilities that provide an 
additional avenue to address and potentially resolve 
obsolescence problems.  DMEA may have the experience and 
expertise to reverse engineer a part or to develop a 
specification for a replacement part.  The organization 
also provides guidance regarding insertion of newer 
technologies to replace logistically unsupportable 
hardware.  The web site for DMEA is 
http://www.dmea.osd.mil. 
3.  The Generalized Emulation of Microcircuits 
The Generalized Emulation of Microcircuits (GEM) 
program is a Government sponsored program intended to 
provide legacy DOD systems with a source of supply for 
parts no longer manufactured by industry.  The program was 
initiated in 1987 and was implemented through an on demand 
contract in 1997.  Emulation does not provide the identical 
part, but a part that has the same form, fit and function.  
This includes all the requisite testing to military 
requirements supported by a Certificate of Conformance. 
Emulation can currently be applied to technology types 
including Resistor Transistor Logic, Diode Transistor 
Logic, Transistor-Transitor Logic, Schottky, Emitter 
Coupled Logic, N-type Metal-Oxide Semiconductor and 
Complimentary Metal-Oxide Semiconductor.  Some of the 
general parameters that GEM can support include part power 
supply of twenty volts and pin counts up to forty-eight. 
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The GEM program also has an online listing of more 
than three hundred separate parts currently available.  The 
listing, which is by part number, makes it possible to 
obtain hard to find parts.  If a needed part does not 
appear in this listing, one can potentially obtain a quote 
for manufacturing a separate part.  The website for the GEM 
program is http://www.gemes.com/  
4.  Government Industry Data Exchange Program (GIDEP) 
The Government Industry Data Exchange Program (GIDEP) 
is an activity developed to foster cooperation between the 
Government and industry.  The program entails the sharing 
of information regarding development, design, production, 
and support of weapon systems.  The sharing of information 
typically results in the issuance of an alert.  This alert 
may notify participants of a technical issue with a certain 
vendor or part.  All U.S. armed services, the Department of 
Energy, the Canadian Department of National Defense, as 
well as other U.S. Government agencies use this 
information.  The corporate participants include Lockheed 
Martin, Raytheon, Boeing, and many others. 
This program was initiated approximately forty years 
ago and has saved an estimated one billion dollars.  In 
addition to notifying participants of technical problems, 
it also gives notice of a manufacturer's intent to 
discontinue part production.  Program managers should use 
this information to reduce or eliminate program impacts.  
The website for GIDEP is 
www.gidep.corona.navy.mil/gidep.htm. 
 
5.  Tactrac and AVCOM 
Several tools currently are available to help manage 
obsolescence.  Two of these tools are Tactrac and AVCOM, 
which are databases related to microelectronic parts.  
Specifically, the data bases list parts according to their 
availability.  Both use a prioritization scheme to reflect 
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the level of risk associated with each part.  They use the 
colors green, yellow, orange, and red to represent 
increasing levels of risk. 
These tools are intended to help determine the overall 
health of any program, assuming that the parts list were 
available.  This would be accomplished by comparing the 
information in the database to the parts list; the 
resulting report would show the overall percentage of red, 
orange and yellow parts.  This information could be an 
invaluable management tool in that it would enable managers 
to develop long term plans to sequentially address and 
eliminate obsolescence and the corresponding program risk.  
The website for these tools is http://www.tdmplus.com/. 
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IV.  ANALYSIS 
A.   INTRODUCTION 
The DOD has invested substantial resources in the 
development, production, and sustainment of weapon systems.  
These systems are needed for a variety of reasons, as are 
the systems currently on the drawing board or being under 
consideration for future development.  Each of these 
systems or products depends on the commercial market for 
parts that are becoming obsolete at an increasing rate.  
Obsolescence, therefore, makes producing and sustaining a 
weapon system more difficult, expensive and, unfortunately, 
risky.  This chapter analyzes the information presented in 
the preceding chapter.  Chapter 5 provides conclusions and 
recommendations for program managers to consider. 
B.   MANAGEMENT 
The program or system manager is primarily responsible 
for ensuring that the weapon system meets performance 
requirements and remains producible as well as supportable.  
No matter which of the numerous program management 
philosophies and styles are used to address system 
obsolescence, the bottom line still requires ongoing and 
proactive obsolescence management to mitigate or preclude 
program impacts. 
One of the keys to successful management of any 
program or problem is information.  Managers, therefore, 
need to become and remain informed.  Although they can 
accomplish this by various means, managers must develop and 
institutionalize mechanisms within the organization to 
ensure that they obtain relevant information on a 
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consistent and timely basis.  Managers need this 
information far in advance of any decisions, before there 
are any impacts on either the production program or the 
readiness of fielded hardware. 
Obsolescence is an area in which managers must remain 
cognizant of industrial and technological trends as they 
relate to the hardware in their particular system.  The 
data found in the literature and obtained from industry all 
support this assertion.  The question then arises as to the 
steps program managers should take to systematically 
address and resolve obsolescence.  The following provides 
the framework to address this question. 
1.  Information 
As indicated previously, one of the first steps 
managers must take is to educate themselves.  Obsolescence, 
although not a new problem, continuously changes from a 
technology perspective, requiring constant attention.  A 
manager should initially obtain information and guidance 
from organizations with the necessary experience and 
expertise.  Depending on the manager’s location, he or she 
may be able to contact an onsite-centralized organization 
responsible for obsolescence management.  If this does not 
exist, the manager should contact the DMS steering group.  
The applicable website was provided in the previous 
chapter.   
2.  System Technology Evaluation 
After obtaining the requisite information and 
understanding, the manager should then designate a central 
point of contact responsible for overall obsolescence 
management.  This point of contact should begin the 
management effort by performing an evaluation of the entire 
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weapon system.  The objective of the evaluation is to gain 
an overall perspective on the number and types of parts 
used within the weapon system from a technological era 
perspective.  The next step is dependent on the acquisition 
phase of the weapon system.  The following discussion 
focuses on systems in production or sustainment. 
C.   PRODUCTION AND SUSTAINMENT 
1.  System Obsolescence Evaluation 
Systems in production or in sustainment typically 
represent mature technology.  After determining the gross 
numbers and types of technologies, managers should perform 
a detailed analysis of the system from an obsolescence 
perspective at the piece part level.  The analysis should 
include some type of risk rating or ranking system.  The 
ranking system should address technological maturity to 
reflect the projected risk associated with the current and 
projected availability of each part.  One way to develop a 
ranking system would be to develop a standardized, 
hierarchical, color-coding system where, for example, red 
means that a part is, or will shortly become, obsolete and 
green indicates no known problems with additional colors 
representing various levels of defined risk. 
One way to effectively accomplish this is to use a 
commercially available tool such as Tactrac or AVCOM.  
These or similar tools, can provide the relevant 
information, including color-coding and ranking by various 
levels of risk.  The ease of performing this effort depends 
directly on the type and amount of information the manager 
has, relative to the configuration. 
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If the program has control of or access to the 
technical data package that includes the detailed parts 
list, the evaluation can readily be accomplished.  However, 
the manager may not have access to the detailed parts lists 
for all or some portions of the system.  In these cases, 
the manager should contact the corresponding manufacturer 
or responsible commodity command to hopefully obtain the 
needed information or ascertain that an ongoing 
obsolescence management program is in place. 
There is another possibility associated with the data.  
Acquisition-streamlining stresses procurement based on 
performance requirements.  Consequently, unless the 
Government specifically purchased the technical data 
package, the applicable parts lists may not be available.  
There also is the possibility the data could be 
proprietary; that is, the vendor may not want to release 
the information for fear that it may end up in a 
competitor’s hands.  Either way, the needed information 
would not be available.  The manager would then have to 
work with the supplier to set up some type of agreement or 
contract to support both immediate and future obsolescence 
analyses and programs. 
Another consideration for the obsolescence management 
program is the media used to store the data.  While older 
systems may have data available only in hard-copy format, 
newer systems should have the data in digital format.  If 
the data were available in hard-copy format only, the 
effort to characterize the technology using computer-based 
tools would be very arduous and, potentially very large, 
depending on the complexity and size of the weapon system. 
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The manager may need to convert the data to a digital 
format, which would allow the data to be manipulated faster 
and more efficiently.  Converting the data to a digital 
format may initially be expensive, but would provide the 
means to more easily analyze and handle the data and 
substantially reduce the future resources needed to manage 
obsolescence during the life of the effort. 
The results from the initial analysis would provide 
the manager with an in-depth obsolescence health report for 
the system.  The next step would be to develop a 
prioritized list, beginning with the parts that are or are 
most likely to become obsolete.  This list would form the 
basis of the obsolescence management plan used to develop a 
comprehensive program to incrementally and systematically 
address and eliminate obsolescence.  After developing the 
priority list and the corresponding program, the manager 
would ensure, prior to any expenditure of funds or 
additional efforts, that the parts or affected systems at 
the top of the list would not be replaced by either a 
system upgrade or an updated version in the near future. 
2.  Obsolescence Options and Planning 
Once an obsolescence problem arises, the manager 
should identify potential options to resolve the issue, 
assuming that some other upgrade would not solve the 
problem.  Potential options include: 
1.  Procuring enough parts to protect the remainder of 
the program.  This is referred to as a life-of-type buy. 
2.  Finding or developing an alternate source. 
3.  Authorizing use of parts that do not meet all 
current performance requirements. 
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4.  Replacing the system with a commercial product. 
5.  Emulating the part. 
6. Designing a replacement that eliminates the 
obsolete part or technology. 
7.  Cannibalizing parts from previously built 
hardware. 
Determining the appropriate option should involve a 
detailed analysis, including: the length of time the system 
will remain in the field; the length of time before another 
upgrade will replace the problem part; the need for the 
solution to be backward compatible; and the overall 
estimated life cycle costs. 
The cost of the option should, initially, receive the 
highest consideration in the analysis.  Additionally, the 
analysis should take into account supportability issues, 
including considerations associated with long-term plans 
for organic or contractor logistics support and training.  
It also should consider other systems, both commercial and 
military, that use or plan to use the corresponding item. 
This would provide the opportunity to work with other users 
to obtain needed parts, jointly develop and share costs for 
needed upgrades, or jointly procure additional units to 
obtain reduced unit costs and potentially provide enough 
incentive for the manufacturer to continue limited 
production. 
a.  Life of Type Buy 
Procuring enough parts to cover the remainder of 
a program is the basic definition of a life of type buy.  
As discussed previously, there is a legal impediment 
precluding this from occurring for a production program.  
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This type of action, however, can alleviate problems 
associated with spares production.  A life of type buy does 
not come without risk, however.  The risk comes from the 
possibility that another part used on the same assembly 
might become obsolete.  If this occurred, the utility 
associated with the lifetime buy would be negated. 
b.  Alternate Source 
As indicated previously, a program could pursue 
several options once the original manufacturer no longer 
supported a part.  One of these options includes finding or 
developing another source.  This option could be pursued 
through the program office or the prime contractor. 
If a manufacturer plans to cease production, the 
manager should make contact immediately to ascertain what 
the manufacturer would require in order to continue 
production.  Assuming that the manufacturer’s requirements 
were beyond what the Government deemed reasonable, the 
manufacturer would then be asked to provide or sell the 
technical data, along with the supporting production 
hardware, tooling and test equipment. 
Another option would be to determine who the 
previous users of the part were and if they had excess 
inventories that they would be willing to sell.  These 
users also might have information regarding other potential 
sources with disposable inventory.  
If the original manufacturer were not interested 
in supporting future production, but provided the technical 
data, the next step would to review parts catalogs to 
determine if parts with similar parameters were available.  
The technical information could also be provided to DLA and 
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other obsolescence management sources to determine if they 
have already seen or resolved the problem. 
If no other sources were found, the next logical 
step would be to determine if another manufacturer would 
produce the item.  The technical data could be provided to 
potential manufacturers.  The interested companies could 
then respond with information, including estimated lead-
time, tooling, and qualification costs, as well as the unit 
production costs.  This information would serve as a 
portion of the economic analysis. 
The likelihood of finding an alternate source, 
however, is small.  Most manufacturers concentrate on 
producing large volumes of parts due to the potential for 
large profits.  Additionally, a large initial investment 
most likely would be required.  This initial investment 
would cover the costs associated with developing and 
proving out the production process and serve to 
substantially increase the unit production cost, 
potentially negating the value of the option. 
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If no other sources or accessible inventory 
exists, then the next potential step would involve 
contacting after-market sources.  An after-market source, 
in this case, consists of a small number of companies that 
specialize in obtaining excess inventory from the original 
manufacturer.  They may also obtain the tooling, dies, and 
excess wafers to support the potential for future 
production.  Two such companies are Rochester and Lansdale, 
which have been working within this niche market for 
numerous years.  They, in a number of cases, may have 
inventory available to support a programs’ immediate 
requirement.   
If the after-market source does not have an 
inventory of the needed part, they may have the capability 
to produce additional components by using the component 
dies/tools and information procured from original 
manufacturer.  However, one would need to consider the 
costs associated with the commercial after-market sources 
as compared to the Government sources such as the DMEA 
which has the capability to manufacture parts through its 
flexible foundry.  One should also consider the GEM program 
to determine if it has the needed parts on hand or has 
emulated it or an equivalent part in the past. 
c.  Reduced Requirements 
One of the primary tenets of acquisition-
streamlining is to obtain hardware that meets but does not 
exceed a requirement.  Military hardware, especially older 
systems, generally was designed with a substantial design 
margin.  There is a distinct possibility that the part 
specified years ago could be replaced with something that 
meets a less stringent requirement without compromising 
system performance.  One would need to verify this through 
an engineering analysis or test. 
For example, assume that a part was used in a 
system that would be sealed to keep the relative humidity 
below 30 percent.  Historically, the military would specify 
ceramic packages because they have proven to be very 
reliable throughout the life of programs.  However, a 
plastic encapsulated microcircuit would most likely perform 
as well as the ceramic part in the low-humidity 
application.  Although there is less data and experience to 
certify long-term reliable performance, these parts are 
less expensive and, more importantly, readily available. 
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This lower cost and greater availability has 
resulted in the increased use of commercial grade parts in 
military applications.  Due to the small quantity of parts 
the military procures per year, one can assume that the 
availability of military-grade parts will continue to 
diminish forcing the DOD to increasingly adapt to using 
more commercial-grade parts.  This adaptation will most 
likely result in reduced reliability and system longevity, 
coupled with increased sustainment costs. 
d.  Part Emulation 
Emulation provides another viable option to 
resolve obsolescence.  Through the previously mentioned GEM 
website, one may potentially obtain information relative to 
the availability of a direct replacement or information 
relative to an available part that could be used with minor 
changes within the system. 
Although emulation may provide a solution, one 
would also need to consider the other parts used in the 
item with the emulated part.  It is very likely that some 
of the other parts represent or use technology similar to 
or older than that of the emulated part, leading one to 
assume that the other parts may also become obsolete in the 
near future.  If this were to occur, the costs associated 
with the emulation would have been spent unnecessarily. 
The previous discussion generally assumes 
availability of technical information associated with the 
part, but this information may not always be available.  In 
such a case, another potential option would be to reverse 
engineer the part.  This, most likely, would be 
substantially more difficult and potentially impossible, 
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depending on the complexity of the part, but it has been 
done.  One potential starting point for this effort would 
be DMEA. 
e.  Redesign 
One of the final steps a manager should consider 
to resolve an obsolescence issue would be to redesign.  
Redesigns may appear simple, but, in reality, they 
typically involve substantial effort, time, resources, and 
risk.  Concurrent with the redesign effort, the manager 
would need to ensure that legacy parts are available to 
support ongoing production and sustainment, with the 
understanding that the redesign effort would, most likely, 
take longer than originally scheduled. 
Due to its costs and risk, redesign should be 
considered the last resort to resolve an obsolescence 
issue.  Redesigns also uncover additional interface 
problems, along with a host of other technical challenges 
that result in substantial cost overruns and schedule 
slips.  Redesigns are necessary and inevitable, but must be 
approached with substantial caution. 
f.  Cannibalization 
The concept of reusing parts from previously 
built hardware is not new.  It may be applicable to some 
systems, but should be used with caution.  If the part is 
to be used in a non-mission critical system, the approach 
may be suitable.  However, due to the uncertainty 
associated with the type of environments a part has seen 
and the amount or type of use the part has experienced, a 
used part should not be considered for any critical systems 
unless there are no other options. 
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D.   DEVELOPMENT 
Systems that are in development and moving toward the 
production phase should be examined from an obsolescence 
perspective at the onset of the program.  Unfortunately, 
this has become necessary due to the increased rate of 
obsolescence. This issue was adeptly captured by two 
statements’:  
If it’s in production it’s obsolete” and “ Once 
it’s in production it’s obsolete [Ref.13: pp. 1-
2].   
Although these statements refer to production, 
obsolescence has now become an issue during development, as 
well.  [Ref.18: p.2]  Initially, the obsolescence program 
would be used to increase awareness and, if necessary, 
educate the development team.  It should subsequently 
develop into an integral part of the design, production, 
and sustainment programs. 
The DMS organization has developed some suggested 
steps for programs in development.  These steps include 
suggested language for development, as well as production 
type contracts.  DMS also supports the assertion that 
development of an active obsolescence program would help to 
ensure a viable production program that would be less 
impacted by obsolescence. 
After implementation of an obsolescence program, it is 
recommended that all proposed parts be systematically and 
periodically reviewed, prior to and after being specified, 
to ensure that the industrial base is likely to support the 




E.   OBSOLESCENCE MANAGEMENT HIERARCHY 
Managing obsolescence requires remaining cognizant of 
ongoing industrial and technical trends; developing and 
executing time-phased program to keep the weapon system 
supportable; and quickly resolving problems associated with 
little or no warning of manufacturers’ intent to quit 
production of a part.  The program manager and the industry 
counterpart necessarily support this process on a 
continuous basis. 
There are no set rules associated with obsolescence 
management, but a manager should pursue a best-value 
approach.  This approach generally means the low-cost 
solution, but other factors must be considered.  The order 
of preference for the options discussed above, beginning 
generally with the lowest-cost, lowest-risk approach is: 
1.  Life-of-Type buy 
2.  Reduce part performance requirements 
3.  Finding another source 
4.  Developing another source 
5.  Emulation 
6.  Redesign 
7.  Cannibalization 
There may be circumstances making one or more of the 
options impractical.  However, this ordering provides a 




F.   PROCUREMENT OPTIONS 
The laws associated with procurement have been shown 
to be an impediment to production programs.  This 
impediment stems directly from law that precludes managers 
from procuring parts that would not be available in the 
near-term.  This limit on managers’ ability to react 
efficiently should be resolved.  The only legal option 
available would be to pursue advanced procurement funds.  
Although theoretically possible, the process and time 
required toreceive approval typically does not support the 
time constraints associated with the current need. 
Managers need the flexibility to quickly evaluate and, 
if appropriate, to procure the quantity of parts needed to 
sustain and protect their programs.  One risk associated 
with this option is that an excess of parts might be 
procured.  However, when one weighs this against the costs 
of the above-mentioned options, the viable answer is to 
modify the existing regulations to provide managers the 
needed flexibility and to reflect the intent and spirit of 
acquisition-streamlining. 
One potential way to gain additional flexibility would 
be for Congress, in the appropriation language, to 
specifically authorize a small percentage of additional 
funds to be used to support obsolescence-related actions.  
This funding should include consideration for annual 
redesigns, as well as limited and life of type 
procurements.  To help ensure that the funding was not 
abused, the applicable service or the procuring activity 
could monitor the actions.  The program office also could 
be required, prior to any procurement of an obsolete part, 
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to provide a detailed justification showing the options and 
associated costs.   This could be reviewed and approved at 
various levels of authority.  The only requirement would be 
to accomplish the overall action and ultimate approval in a 
short period of time. 
Another possibility would be to use the currently 
available infrastructure to manage the effort.  As an 
example, DMS or DMEA could be authorized to fund emergency 
procurements if they were justified.  The governing 
organization could review and, if appropriate, authorize 
the action. 
There also is the possibility that DMS or DMEA could 
delegate this authority to offices responsible for 
obsolescence located at major subordinate commands.  These 
satellite offices could be delegated the responsibility and 
authority, up to a designated single or annual procurement 
level, to authorize procurement of parts becoming obsolete. 
The additional funding to support the infrastructure 
and the review cycle could come from Congress or the 
program offices that use the service.  Requiring the users 
to pay for the service would help ensure an efficient 
system and quickly show the community support for the 
overall obsolescence initiative. 
Another option that could provide additional 
flexibility, assuming that Congress did not change the laws 
or provide additional flexibility in the appropriation 
language, would be to delegate overall responsibility to 
program offices.  This would include the ability to procure 
parts with the understanding that the funds used would be 
reimbursed, assuming it was justified.  Justification could 
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be provided to the governing organization as previously 
discussed.  Numerous possibilities and variations could be 
developed to support this concept. 
What other steps could a program take to protect 
itself?  Pursuing a multi-year procurement for the end item 
would allow procurement of parts to support numerous years 
and, more importantly, provide program stability.  This 
stability would serve to reduce the number of vendors that 
cease parts production.  It would also provide the 
flexibility to procure parts in more economical quantities.   
The multi-year contract should require the prime 
contractor to monitor the vendor base from an obsolescence 
perspective.  Historically, prime contractors determined 
that parts were no longer available when they released heir 
annual purchase orders.  Due to the dynamic nature of the 
microelectronic parts industry, one could require, through 
the contract, a semiannual evaluation of the 
microelectronic vendor base.  This would require funding up 
front, but it would provide valuable information and, most 
importantly, provide additional time to address an 
obsolescence issue. 
If a multi-year contract is not feasible and no other 
flexibility is provided, then the program should try to 
annually obtain authority to procure a limited quantity of 
critical parts, including those that are projected to 
become obsolete.  This could partially be accomplished 
through the use of advanced procurement funds.  Although 
this action would not provide the security of a multi-year 
contract, it would give managers additional time to address 
a problem. 
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One final area that deserves greater emphasis is the 
potential of additional DOD partnering with allied nations.  
Some efforts have been taken to work with the international 
community, but the effort could be expanded.  This would 
provide greater opportunity for all affected parties to 
work cooperatively.  This cooperative effort could decrease 
costs for all participants, eliminate duplicate efforts, 
and increase the probability of finding an alternate source 
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V.  CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A.   INTRODUCTION 
Microelectronic obsolescence is a phenomenon that 
results from technological advances.  The increased rate of 
these advances has provided DOD with the potential to more 
efficiently and economically project greater defense 
capabilities.  However, it also has made it increasingly 
difficult to obtain the parts needed to produce and sustain 
weapon systems.  In addition to the problem of obtaining 
the necessary parts, program managers are permitted to buy 
only those parts needed for immediate use and are, in some 
cases, precluded, by law, from buying enough to ensure 
uninterrupted future production. 
B.   CONCLUSIONS 
Although the problems caused by obsolescence are not 
new, they are becoming more prevalent for two reasons.  The 
first reason is the amount of hardware DOD procures.  In 
the past, DOD procured substantially greater quantities of 
microelectronic hardware that represented a substantially 
greater portion of the market.  Now, however, it has been 
estimated that DOD represents less than one percent of the 
overall microcircuit market.  Consequently, the commercial 
sector does not focus on DOD’s requirements, but on areas 
that are more profitable. 
The second reason for the increased occurrence of 
obsolescence is the increased rate of technological 
advances.  Today, the commercial market drives these rapid 
technological advances.  Since the DOD no longer steers or 
controls the vast majority of research or technological 
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advances, it must take steps to ensure that legacy and 
future systems capitalize on commercially developed 
technologies and equipment.  The rapid change in technology 
is exacerbated by DOD’s need to maintain fielded systems 
well beyond their intended lives, resulting in systems that 
remain active in the field for decades. 
The DOD has taken steps to leverage the technological 
advances made in the commercial market by implementing 
acquisition-streamlining initiatives.  These initiatives 
stress the use of COTS and open architectures that should 
help to partially alleviate the ongoing problem with 
obsolescence and help to reduce the amount DOD invests in 
research and development. 
The DOD has taken additional steps to counteract the 
effects of obsolescence, among them the establishment of an 
obsolescence focal point, DMS, which is responsible for 
overseeing, administering, and leading the efforts 
associated with obsolescence.  Other ongoing efforts 
include work being done by DMEA, DLA, and each of the 
services.  The ultimate goals of these efforts are to allow 
programs to obtain identical parts, find alternate but 
functionally equivalent parts, jointly develop solutions, 
or to develop the ability to manufacture hard-to-find parts 
in order to avoid or delay the substantial cost and risk 
associated with inevitable redesign. 
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Sustainment and production programs rely on viable 
sources of parts.  However, regulatory funding constraints 
prevent program managers from buying parts in sufficient 
quantity to protect ongoing production programs.  This 
situation arises when a redesign program to replace 
obsolete hardware takes two or more years to complete.  
Even with the redesign effort underway, the ongoing 
production program requires sufficient quantities of parts 
to sustain ongoing production.  However, under the current 
system, advance procurement funds can be used to purchase 
only enough parts to sustain an existing production program 
for one year beyond the current year.  Thus, managers 
cannot buy a sufficient quantity to maintain ongoing 
production. 
Participation in DOD obsolescence initiatives is 
primarily voluntary.  While individual managers choose to 
pursue these initiatives to resolve issues impacting their 
programs, there is no mechanism to coordinate efforts to 
resolve common problems.  The reason for this appears to be 
funding.  Additional funding would provide the means to 
establish a more centralized and comprehensive effort, 
including a centralized database.  This database would, 
ideally, reflect all DOD programs at the microelectronic 
parts level.  Such a mechanism would make it possible to 
efficiently identify all systems impacted by an obsolete 
part and to eliminate or greatly reduce the possibility of 
several programs simultaneously addressing the same 
problem.   
This database would be a valuable resource for 
programs in the initial stages of system design or during 
the redesign stage.  It would help to ensure that new 
designs did not contain microelectronic parts projected to 
become obsolete in the near future.  The database also 
would allow program managers to identify industry trends in 
order to support long-term planning. 
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Although DOD has taken some substantial steps to 
address obsolescence, it should take additional steps by 
working more closely with allied nations.  There has been 
some effort in this area, but greater focus is needed.  
Some of our allies may be producing or have the ability to 
produce technologies that have been abandoned by the U.S. 
industrial base.  Even if U.S. industry could still provide 
the technology, competition from a foreign source would 
likely result in reduced costs. 
Allies also could offer financial support for the 
obsolescence programs.  In addition to reducing all 
participants’ costs for obsolescence initiatives and 
reducing or eliminating duplicate efforts, cost-sharing 
would help ensure that the U.S. and its allies are better 
capable of producing and supporting vital equipment during 
times of war or police actions. 
The idea of cost-sharing also should be applied at the 
program level for program-specific issues.  A reasonable 
portion of the costs should be borne by all nations that 
ultimately receive the benefits derived from the 
obsolescence program. 
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Another way that DOD could reduce cost would be to 
encourage major DOD contractors to consolidate their 
internal obsolescence efforts.  DOD contractors, in 
general, have numerous stand-alone business sectors that 
use and rely on the same parts.  However, each business 
sector, tends to address its own obsolescence issues.  
Consolidating or linking these efforts would help to 
streamline the overall process and eliminate redundancy.  
There also is the potential for separate companies to work 
together and consolidate requirements when buying obsolete 
parts to help reduce cost and convince manufacturers to 
produce limited quantities of older components.  
C.   RECOMMENDATIONS 
Since it can be assumed that the problem of 
microelectronic obsolescence will continue to impact DOD, 
managers should establish obsolescence programs that become 
an ongoing and integral part of their programs’ daily 
activities.  The objective of these programs is to 
aggressively and proactively manage obsolescence to reduce 
the overall impact on DOD programs.  Ideally, obsolescence 
programs should be established at the outset of a program, 
become very active during system design and development, 
and continue through the remaining life of the effort. 
The obsolescence program should capitalize on the 
resources available within both DOD and industry, including 
access to no less than one commercial tool such as Tactrac.  
Tools such as Tactrac provide a risk assessment for parts 
that could readily be used to evaluate, categorize 
according to risk, and subsequently develop a sequential, 
part-by-part plan to replace or design out problem parts. 
Initial efforts should include discussion with 
representatives from DMS and from other programs with 
ongoing obsolescence programs, local obsolescence experts, 
and relevant industrial resources.  These discussions would 
provide valuable insight, guidance, expertise, and would 
serve as the foundation for a viable proactive obsolescence 
program. 
In addition to working within the DOD, managers should 
require, as an integral part of applicable contracts, 
obsolescence assessments.  This requirement would 
complement the ongoing efforts of program offices and DOD.  
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Relevant guidance regarding specific contractual language 
should be obtained from DMS. 
Once an obsolescence office has been established, the 
manager should begin an analysis of the overall program 
from an obsolescence perspective.  This analysis would 
provide a list of parts that are, or are projected to 
become, obsolete.  Managers could then use this list to 
develop a time-phased plan to systematically address or 
replace the obsolete parts.  Initial efforts should 
concentrate on parts that are currently obsolete and then 
address problems in descending order of priority. 
Any solution must take into consideration economics.  
An analysis should be conducted for each part to determine 
the most cost-effective, long-term solution.  The preferred 
orders of potential solutions, beginning with the lowest-
cost approach, is as follows: 
1.  Life-of-Type buy 
2.  Reduce part performance requirements 
3.  Find another source 
4.  Develop another source 
5.  Emulation 
6.  Redesign 
7.  Cannibalization 
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Prior to addressing any obsolescence problem, the 
program should work with DMS or the command obsolescence 
representative to determine if other programs have 
previously addressed and resolved the problem.  If others 
have already done so, the program should capitalize on 
their effort to quickly eliminate the issue.  If others 
have not resolved the problem, the program should identify 
other programs that use the same part(s) and investigate 
the possibility of sharing costs. 
Once the initial obsolescence assessment has been 
completed, including development of the program to 
systematically eliminate obsolescence, the program office 
should maintain constant surveillance to identify 
additional obsolescence problems as early as possible.  The 
obsolescence program should be a cooperative effort between 
Government and industry and provide a flexible and robust 
effort capable of meeting the ongoing needs of the program.  
The overall obsolescence program should include some form 
of continuous redesigns that takes into consideration the 
potential benefits of COTS and industry trends. 
Funding will be required to support the obsolescence 
program, and to cover personnel, part procurement, 
redesigns, and contractor surveillance efforts.  Managers, 
therefore, must project funding requirements well in 
advance of need and should include, as part of their annual 
budget requirement, funds to support the obsolescence 
efforts.  They should also annually pursue, as part of the 
normal budgeting cycle, advance procurement funding for 
purchasing a small group of pre-selected parts ahead of the 
contractual need.  This should help to reduce some of the 
program impacts and allow additional time to address and 
resolve know obsolescence problems. 
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Besides implementing strong obsolescence programs, DOD 
should pursue multi-year contracts, which would minimize 
the impact of obsolescence by allowing for economical order 
quantities and provide the benefits of a stable funding 
profile.  This stability would give manufacturers some 
incentive to remain in production, thus reducing or 
delaying obsolescence problems. 
If a multi-year contract is not a viable option, the 
program office, along with its industry-counterpart, should 
identify and seek approval for an economical order quantity 
to cover several single-year, stand-alone procurement 
contracts.  This would not eliminate obsolescence, but, 
like the multi-year contract, would serve to reduce or 
delay the impact. 
In addition to the contractual options, production 
programs should be given additional flexibility to procure 
parts that unexpectedly become obsolete in order to ensure 
uninterrupted production.  The added flexibility should 
permit the procurement of parts in substantial quantity to, 
if necessary, cover several years of production.  This 
could be accomplished in several ways.  The first and most 
expeditious method would be for Congress to authorize 
programs to buy quantities of parts going obsolete in 
excess of what is needed for the immediate contract.  
Congress could explicitly provide this flexibility in the 
procurement appropriation language.  Congress could also 
take steps to add a law that provides this flexibility and 
delegates authority to the applicable acquisition 
executive, program executive office or program office. 
66 
Another method to achieve additional flexibility would 
be for Congress to change the language in several 
regulations and laws.  The first change needed would be the 
elimination of the following phrase from DOD 5002: “,... 
but only in sufficient quantity to support the next fiscal 
year quantity end item.”  Another important change would be 
for Statute 31 USC 1502 (a) to exclude the sentence, 
“However, the appropriation is not available for 
expenditure for a period beyond what was authorized by 
law.” 
In addition to changes to procurement requirements, 
DOD should take steps to further centralize all efforts 
associated with obsolescence and should require all 
programs to participate in these efforts.  DOD should 
develop a central database into which programs load their 
configuration baselines or, at least, their lists of known 
problems parts, and it should provide annual funding to 
support the ongoing efforts.  This database could then be 
used to more efficiently identify which programs are, or 
will be, impacted by an obsolete part.  It would also serve 
as a foundation for effected programs to cooperatively 
develop solutions and share investment costs. 
Finally, DOD should take steps to work more closely 
and develop an ongoing obsolescence program with foreign 
allies.  This would help to reduce the overall cost for 
each participant and provide another potential source of 
supply to supplement the US industrial base. 
D.   SUMMARY 
Microelectronic obsolescence is not a new problem.  
However, its growing prevalence makes it increasingly 
difficult to maintain a viable production or sustainment 
program.  Although obsolescence cannot be avoided, it can 
be managed by implementing a robust program to 
systematically address the problem.  This program should 
consist of dedicated personnel working cooperatively with 
their industry counterparts, DOD organizations, and, 
potentially, foreign allies. 
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Besides the need for obsolescence programs, changes 
are needed in the procurement laws or appropriation 
language to allow managers additional flexibility to 
resolve the problems associated with obsolescence.  
Managers should pursue advance procurement funds or other 
applicable funding sources to proactively and 
systematically address and eliminate obsolescence.  This 
problem will continue for the foreseeable future.  However, 
with the appropriate attention, it can be managed. 
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